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Robinson: Substantive Law in Arbitration Proceedings
NO TES
SUBSTANTIVE LAW IN ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
One of the several differences between civil arbitration and litigation lies in the application of rules of substantive law. Whether a
party to arbitration can attack the award because of the arbitrators'
failure to adhere to those rules is the thesis of this paper. The discussion of the problem will be limited as far as possible to the situation as it exists in Florida. Resort to outside cases will be had only
when the Florida law on the point is as yet undeveloped.
1
In 1957 the Florida statutory law of civil arbitration, after re2
maining static for a period of almost 129 years, was supplemented
by the addition of twenty-two new sections. s This addition, which was
adopted from the Uniform Arbitration Act promulgated by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1955, 4 provides, in essence, a
completely new law of arbitration. The provisions of the new statute will be discussed in contrast to, and separately as they add to or
detract from, the old statutory and the common law methods.
THE GENERAL RuLE

The orthodox doctrine is that once a dispute has been submitted
to arbitration and an award has been made, it cannot be attacked
on the ground that the arbitrators failed to apply rules of substantive law correctly. 5 This doctrine is subject to numerous qualifications, variations, and exceptions, which will be discussed later.
Basically, the procedures and rules of law that govern an arbitration hearing are those which the parties themselves adopt and
specify in the arbitration agreement. The parties are free to adopt
any rules and procedures desired as long as they are not contrary to
law or public policy.6 If they specify in the arbitration agreement
that disputes are to be decided in accordance with substantive law,
1FLA. STAT. ch. 57 (1957).

2The law originally appeared as Acts of the Legislative Council, Nov. 17, 1828,

§9.

3FLA. STAT. §§57.10-.31 (1957). For an excellent comparison and discussion of
the statutes, see Albritton, An Analysis of Florida Arbitration Law, 31 FLA. B.J. 121
(1957). See also Stern and Troetschel, The Role of Modern Arbitration in the
Progressive Development of Florida Law, 7 MIAMI L.Q. 205 (1953).
49 U.L.A. 76 (1957).
SCassara v. Wofford, 55 So.2d 102 (Fla. 1951); Johnson v. Wells, 72 Fla. 290, 73
So. 188 (1916).
6STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AwARDs §214 (1980).
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the award will be subject to review for the arbitrators' failure to follow the appropriate substantive law.7 If the parties do not so specify,
failure by the arbitrators to apply the law correctly will not be a
valid ground for disturbing the award. 8
This rule is in some doubt in Florida with regard to attacks on
common law awards as a result of the decision in Glens Falls Ins. Co.
v. Gulf Breeze Cottages.9 Apparently it still applies to statutory
awards, under both the previous statutory arbitration procedure' °
and the 1957 Florida Arbitration Law." There are no cases construing the new Florida act. However, under the New York law,12 after
which the recent Florida act is modeled and with which it is in many
instances identical, 13 the cases uphold awards challenged for the arbitrators' failure to follow rules of substantive law unless the parties
have specified that the dispute will be decided in accordance with
4

such rules.1

When the award states on its face that it is based on rules of substantive law and the arbitrators misapply or misconstrue these rules,
the validity of either a common law or statutory arbitration award
can be attacked. 15 The mistake or misapplication must be clearly set
forth and proved before the award will be vacated or modified.16
Generally the courts look favorably upon arbitration awards and
will not upset them unless there is obvious injustice or infringement
of the substantial rights of a party.
An arbitrator's mistake of law or fact amounting only to an error
7
of judgment is not sufficient in itself to expose an award to attack.
Merely to establish that the case would have been decided differently
7Tabor v. Craft, 217 Ala. 276, 116 So. 132 (1928); see STURGES, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 793-96.
8Ogden v. Baile, 73 Fla. 1103, 75 So. 795 (1917); Johnson v. Wells, supra note 5.
938 So.2d 828 (Fla. 1949).

'oSee National Hotel v. Koretzky, 96 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1957).
11FL.

STAT. §§57.10-.31 (1957).

2N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT. §§1448-1469.
13E.g., id. §§1450, 1458, 1462.
14See, e.g., John Post Constr. Corp. v. Good Humor Corp., 9 Misc. 2d 392,
N.Y.S.2d 383 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Matter of Cross & Brown Co., 4 App. Div. 2d
167 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1st Dep't 1957); In re Suffolk & Nassau Amusement Co.,
N.Y.S.2d 427 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
'5Fudickar v. Guardian Mut. Life Ins. Co., 62 N.Y. 392 (1875); STURGES,
cit. supra note 6, at 797.
l6Mickles v. Thayer, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 114 (1867).
7Johnson v. Wells, 72 Fla. 290, 73 So. 188 (1916).
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NOTES
by a court or by some other arbitrator is not fatal to an award.1 8 A
mistake of fact sufficient to allow the overturning of an award must
be such as to lead the arbitrator to a patently false result.19 Such
mistakes must be more than mere errors of judgment, and they are
infrequently found. They may be illustrated by a situation in which
the arbitrators relied upon incorrect weights or measures or other
false tokens in their deliberations. This reliance amounts to more
than reasoning and judgment, and leads to such a false result as to
be contrary to substantial justice. 20 Thus a mistake of law alone will
not provide a ground for vacating an award, while in some instances
a mistake of fact may become the basis for a successful challenge.
Another category of mistake that may prove fatal to an award exists
when, because of the mistake, the award fails to express the real decision of the arbitrators.21 This category includes the arbitrators'
mistake in mathematical calculations 22 and their misunderstanding
of the effect of provisions.in a form which was provided for setting
23
forth their award.
24
Courts generally will not review arbitration awards on the merits,
or because they are inadequate or excessive. The prevailing viewpoint
is that the parties, having submitted themselves to arbitration, are
bound by the award as reached, and to allow appeal on the basis of
a mistake or a misapplication of law would not be the end of litigation but the beginning.25 When parties decide to arbitrate, they
waive their right to a court determination of the controversy between
them. 26 In extreme cases, when the result can fairly be said to be too
shocking to be tolerable, an equity court may grant review on the
ground that the award is evidence tending to show fraud, corruption,
2
or partiality. 7
When the arbitrators expressly undertake to decide a dispute
before them on the basis of existing law, the law must be clearly
18STURGES, CoMMERcIAL ARBrATIONS AND AwARDs 788

(1930).

loUnderhill v. Van Cortlandt, 2 Johns. Ch. 335 (N.Y. 1817).
20STURGEs, op. cit. supra note 18, at 789, 790.

2lGoddard v. King, 40 Minn. 164, 41 N.W. 659 (1889).
22See Kutsukian v. Bossom, 270 App. Div. 396, 60 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1st Dep't 1946).
2
3STURGES, op. cit. supra note 18, at 793.
24E.g., Morris White Fashions, Inc. v. Susquehanna Mills, Inc., 295 N.Y. 450, 68
N.E.2d 437 (1946).
25Burchess v. Marsh, 58 US. (17 How.) 344 (1855).
26See Pine Street Realty Co. v. Coutroulos, 233 App. Div. 404, 253 N.Y. Supp.
174 (Ist Dep't 1931).
27STuRGESo,op. cit. supra note 18, at 797, 798.
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settled before their award can be challenged for failure to decide
in accordance with

it.

s

If the particular point of law involved is in

considerable dispute in the jurisdiction, it is too much to expect the
arbitrators to know the law when courts and lawyers are in doubt.
The law of evidence is generally not applicable to arbitration proceedings, so that an award cannot be upset for the admission of evidence that would be excluded in a court proceeding.2 9 However, if
the arbitrators received evidence under a misinterpretation of the
rules and the evidence would not have been admitted had they been
properly apprised of the rules, there is a mistake of law rather than
an error of judgment, and an attack on the award will be allowed.30
If the mistake is discovered by the arbitrators before the award is
reached and they still proceed to an award, review will not be permitted.31 Although, with the exception just stated, an award cannot
be vacated for the improper admission of evidence, it can be attacked
for the exclusion of material evidence.32 This is because the parties
have the right to a full and impartial hearing. Any failure in this
respect raises a presumption of partiality that entitles the aggrieved
party to judicial review. 3
This discussion of some of the grounds for attack does not purport to be exhaustive; it is included primarily to illustrate the possible exceptions to the basic rule.
FLORIDA LAW

To reiterate the majority, if not the universal, rule, an arbitration award cannot be attacked for the arbitrators' failure to adhere
to rules of substantive law, 34 subject to various exceptions, some of

which have been noted above. Florida has always followed this majority rule as it is applied to statutory awards and, until fairly
recently, has also observed it in the case of common law arbitration. 35
2sMathews v. Miller, 25 W. Va. 817 (1885).
29Waterman v. Merrow, 94 Me. 237, 47 Atl. 157 (1900); Brodhed-Garrett Co. v.
Davis Lumber Co., 97 W. Va. 165 (1924).
30STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS 480

(1930).

311bid.
321d. at 480-81.

33Ibid.
34Cassara v. Wofford, 55 So.2d 102 (Fla. 1951); Johnson v. Wells, 72 Fla. 290, 73
So. 188 (1916).

35E.g., Cassara v. Wofford, supra note 34; Ogden v. Baile, 73 Fla. 1103, 75 So.
795 (1917); Johnson v. Wells, supra note 34.
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As early as 1916, the Florida Supreme Court indicated adherence to
this view in Johnson v. Wells, saying in regard to a common law
award, "The courts regarded the matters submitted as concluded by
the award, and in an action thereon would not review the merits of
the arbitrators' findings."36 The case arose under a statutory arbitration proceeding, and the foregoing statement was made as a comparison of common law and statutory arbitration. After deciding
that in matters of grounds for attack the common law and statutory
arbitration procedures were identical, the Court said:3 7
"The award, under a statutory submission, which is regular on
its face, is conclusive upon the merits of the controversy submitted and is a final adjudication until impeached in an appropriate proceeding upon sufficient grounds .... It is a final
adjudication by a court of the parties' own choice, and is entided to the respect due to the judgment of a court of last
resort."
The most recent Florida case to restate the majority rule in statutory arbitration proceedings was decided in 1957,38 when the Supreme Court upheld an arbitration award against a challenge which,
while ostensibly based upon the authorized statutory grounds of
misbehavior or gross negligence, a3 actually sought a review of the
arbitration hearing on the merits. The opposition of the Court to
review of statutory arbitration was made inescapably clear.
Although this same attitude was shown toward common law
awards for almost half a century, the holding in the Glens Falls case
in 1949 was a complete turnabout from both conventional doctrine
and the established rule in Florida.40 In that case, the defendant
appealed from a chancery decree which had reviewed an appraisal
made pursuant to an insurance contract between the parties. The
original appraisal was quite favorable to the insurance company. The
Court of Record of Escambia County, sitting in chancery, revised the
findings of the appraisers to the detriment of the insurance company,
which then appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that section
57.07 of the Florida statutes set forth the sole and exclusive grounds
3672 Fla. 290,296, 73 So. 188, 190 (1916).
371d. at 296, 73 So. at 190.

3sMerritt-Chapman 8- Scott Corp. v. State Road Dep't, 98 So.2d 85 (Fla. 1957).
39FLA. STAT. §57.07 (1957).
4OSee note 35 supra.
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upon which an award might be attacked. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's action on the ground that the appraisal proceedings were of the common law variety, since there was no supervision by the court, and therefore section 57.07 did not apply. On the
inapplicability of this section to a common law arbitration proceeding,
the Court is on solid ground; it is only when the justices state that
a common law award is subject to attack for the arbitrators' failure
to apply rules of substantive law correctly that they depart from accepted doctrine.
Not only is this conclusion a non sequitur but it is contrary to
all the previous decisions on this point in Florida-' and in the great
majority of other jurisdictions.42 It has been suggested that if this
decision is not confined to appraisals or to cases involving mere incorrect value determinations, it may well be the death knell of common law arbitration in Florida, or at least cast "considerable doubt
on the conclusiveness of all common law awards in Florida."' 3 The
purpose of arbitration is to reach a speedy, final settlement of disputes between parties without resort to the court system.44 To allow
awards to be reviewed on the merits when the only ground offered is
the failure of the arbitrators, who are perhaps without legal training,
to follow rules of substantive law would defeat the entire purpose of
arbitration and would leave common law arbitration in Florida nothing more than a hollow, curious vestige of former days.
Unfortunately, in National Hotel v. Koretzky, the only subsequent decision to discuss this issue, the Florida Supreme Court indicated an intention to follow the Glens Falls case in all common law
arbitrations, saying, "If a common-law award, the attack on the award
may be based on a charge that the arbitrators erroneously applied
rules of law in arriving at their decision." 45 The Court then decided
that regardless of which type of arbitration was involved, the arbitrators had not erred in their method or computations and remanded
the case for reinstatement of the original award. Although the quoted
statement was only dictum in the case, the clear restatement of the
Glens Falls holding has a ring of ominous finality. The unequivocal
35 supra.
42See, e.g., Greenough v. Rolfe, 4 N.H. 357 (1827); Rosenbaum v. Drucker, 346
Pa. 434, 31 A.2d 117 (1943); Palmer v. Van Wyck, 92 Tenn. 397, 215 S.W. 761
(1893).
431 FLA. LAW & PRAc., Arbitration §33 (1955).
44Burchess v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344 (1855).
4596 So.2d 774, 775 (Fla. 1957) (dictum).
41See note
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NO TES
statement that a common law award may be challenged for the arbitrators' erroneous application of law bypasses the limitations suggested previously and extends the Glens Falls rule to all common law
awards, not merely appraisals or value determinations. Barring a
sudden reversion to pre-Glens Falls law, any hope of finality of a
common law arbitration award seems precluded.
If the grounds for review now apparently sanctioned for common law awards are extended to statutory awards, the whole field of
arbitration will suffer a staggering blow. However, the National Hotel case seems to limit clearly the grounds of review of statutory
awards to those specified in the statute. Thus the exclusive grounds
for attack on an award under the new section 57.22 would be fraud,
corruption, or other undue means evidencing partiality by the arbitrators; corruption or prejudicial misconduct by any of the arbitrators; exceeding of their powers by the arbitrators; conduct of the
hearing in such a manner as to prejudice substantially the rights of a
party; or lack of agreement to arbitrate subject to the arbitration
act.46 If this supposition is correct, the grounds for attack remain
essentially the same under the new statute, and the award remains
inviolate as far as the arbitrators' determinations of fact and applications of law are concerned.
NEw YORK LAw

There are as yet no Florida cases construing the provisions of the
newly enacted arbitration legislation. However, cases construing the
New York arbitration statutes, 47 which are very similar to, and in
many cases identical with, the new Florida arbitration act,4s follow
the general rule that an award may not be challenged for the arbitrators' failure to follow rules of substantive law.49 Under the portion
of the New York arbitration law5O corresponding to section 57.22 of
Florida Statutes 1957, the grounds for upsetting an award are corruption, fraud, or other undue means evidencing partiality or corruption in the arbitrators' conduct of the hearing; misbehavior that
prejudices the rights of the parties when the arbitrators exceed their
powers; imperfect execution of the arbitrators' powers so that a final
46FLA. STAT.

§§57.10-.31 (1957).

47N.Y. Crv. PAc. Acr. §§1448-1469.
4
8Cf. notes 46, 47 supra.
49See note 14 supra.
50N.Y. Cirv. PaRc. Acr §1462.
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and mutual award is not made; or lack of a valid submission or contract to arbitrate under the statute. In this respect, the new Florida
arbitration act is an almost verbatim recitation of the parallel portion
of the New York act.
In construing this statute, a New York court has said: 51
"There has been no showing of prejudice. We find nothing
else in the conduct of the arbitrators which could be considered
misconduct. All of the complaints of substance relate to alleged
errors of fact or law made by the arbitrators, which we may
not review."
Subsequent cases have continued to uphold the general rule and to
disturb the deliberations and awards of arbitrators only when one or
more of the specific statutory grounds is found to exist. 52
If Florida follows the New York courts in interpreting the new
arbitration statute, statutory arbitration awards in Florida are in no
danger of being set aside on the basis of the arbitrators' misapplication of law or mere errors of judgment in matters of substantive law.
Cases in at least thirty-one other jurisdictions"3 follow the general

rule, on the same rationale, not only in statutory arbitration but in
common law proceedings as well. Florida is one of only two jurisdictions that have departed from the rule that a common law award
cannot be vacated for the arbitrators' failure to follow substantive
law. Pennsylvania allows attack on a statutory award for errors of
law; but the statute which specifically allows this pertains only to
modification, and Pennsylvania arbitration law is in foul condition
4

in this area.5

Since common law arbitration in Florida is undesirable from a
number of standpoints, such as the difficulty of enforcing an award
and the highly revocable character of the common law arbitration
agreement, 55 perhaps the additional drawback engrafted on the law
by the Glens Falls holding is not an intolerable burden. With the
highly limited usefulness common law arbitration enjoyed prior to
"Brighton

Mills, Inc. v. Rayon Corp., 282 App. Div. 670, 122 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1st

Dep't 1953).
52See, e.g., cases cited note 14 supra.
5See, e.g., cases cited note 42 supra.
54For a discussion of the uncertainty in the Pennsylvania arbitration law, see
Symposium, 24 TEMP. L.Q. 146-61 (1950).
55See note 3 supra.
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the Glens Falls case, even its complete departure from the legal scene
will probably be no great loss. Doubtless the new arbitration act can
more than adequately fill any gap in Florida law that may be created
by the complete disappearance of common law arbitration.
CONCLUSION

Although there is considerable confusion as to when courts will
intervene to vacate or modify an arbitration award, the generalization
can safely be made that in the vast majority of the jurisdictions they
will do so only when a statutory ground exists, and that in neither
a statutory nor a common law proceeding will a court review the
award on the basis of a mistake or misapplication of rules of substantive law. The basic qualification to this statement in Florida
law, since the decision in the Glens Falls case, is that the courts will
review common law awards for arbitrators' errors of law. This, in
effect, emasculates the usefulness of common law arbitration in Florida and defeats the purpose of submitting a dispute to arbitration.
However, in view of the continued existence of the 1828 arbitration
act and the 1957 addition, Florida retains very effective arbitration
procedures that can be utilized by persons interested in swift and
final settlement of civil disputes outside the judicial arena.
In extreme cases, when the errors of the arbitrators are so gross
that they lead to completely inequitable results, the courts can resort
to the doctrines of fraud, bias, and partiality. Simply by labeling the
result as indicative of improper conduct on the part of the arbitrators, the courts can bypass the prohibition against reviewing for errors of law. However, they are very reluctant to adopt this approach,56
and"will probably do so only when all other available remedies fail
and the award as written dearly indicates a crying need for judicial
review. Except in such cases, the courts are much more willing to
apply such doctrines as waiver in order to give full force and effect
to the findings of the arbitrators. As long as this desirable end has
been reached, barring manifest injustice, the decisions of the arbitrators on the law will stand.
JAMEs

56STmEs, COm M

S.

ROBINSON

cAL ARBrATiONS AND Aw~Ais § §214, 218 (1930).
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